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Summary 
Prior to the initiation of economic reforms and trade liberalization 35 years ago, China 
maintained policies that kept the economy very poor, stagnant, centrally controlled, vastly 
inefficient, and relatively isolated from the global economy. Since opening up to foreign trade and 
investment and implementing free market reforms in 1979, China has been among the world’s 
fastest-growing economies, with real annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 
nearly 10% through 2013. In recent years, China has emerged as a major global economic and 
trade power. It is currently the world’s second-largest economy, largest trading economy, second-
largest destination of foreign direct investment (FDI), largest manufacturer, and largest holder of 
foreign exchange reserves.  
The global economic crisis that began in 2008 greatly affected China’s economy. China’s exports, 
imports, and FDI inflows declined, GDP growth slowed, and millions of Chinese workers 
reportedly lost their jobs. The Chinese government responded by implementing a $586 billion 
economic stimulus package, loosening monetary policies to increase bank lending, and providing 
various incentives to boost domestic consumption. Such policies enabled China to effectively 
weather the effects of the sharp global fall in demand for Chinese products, while several of the 
world’s leading economies experienced negative or stagnant economic growth. From 2008 to 
2011, China’s real GDP growth averaged 9.6%. However, the economy has shown signs of 
slowing in recent years. Real GDP grew by 7.7% in both 2012 and 2013. 
Some economists forecast that China will overtake the United States as the world’s largest 
economy within a few years. However, the ability of China to maintain a rapidly growing 
economy in the long run will depend largely on the ability of the Chinese government to 
implement comprehensive economic reforms that more quickly hasten China’s transition to a free 
market economy; rebalance the Chinese economy by making consumer demand, rather than 
exporting and fixed investment, the main engine of economic growth; boost productivity and 
innovation; address growing income disparities; and enhance environmental protection. The 
Chinese government has acknowledged that its current economic growth model needs to be 
altered and has announced several initiatives to address various economic challenges. In 
November 2013, the Communist Party of China held the Third Plenum of its 18th Party Congress, 
which issued a communique outlining a number of broad policy statements on reforms that would 
be implemented by 2020. Many of the proposed reforms are measures that would seek to boost 
competition and economic efficiency. For example, the communique stated that the market would 
now play a “decisive” role in allocating resources in the economy. 
China’s economic rise has significant implications for the United States and hence is of major 
interest to Congress. On the one hand, China is a large (and potentially huge) export market for 
the United States. Many U.S. firms use China as the final point of assembly in their global supply 
chain networks. China’s large holdings of U.S. Treasury securities help the federal government 
finance its budget deficits. However, some analysts contend that China maintains a number of 
distortive economic policies (such as protectionist industrial policies and an undervalued 
currency) that undermine U.S. economic interests. They warn that efforts by the Chinese 
government to promote indigenous innovation, often through the use of subsidies and other 
distortive measures, could negatively affect many leading U.S. industries. This report surveys the 
rise of China’s economy, describes major economic challenges facing China, and discusses the 
implications of China’s economic rise for the United States. 
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he rapid rise of China as a major economic power within a time span of about three 
decades is often described by analysts as one of the greatest economic success stories in 
modern times. From 1979 (when economic reforms began) to 2013, China’s real gross 
domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of nearly 10%.1 It is estimated that to 
date 500 million people in China have been raised out of extreme poverty. China has emerged as 
a major global economic power. It is now the world’s largest manufacturer, merchandise exporter, 
and holder of foreign exchange reserves. China is currently the second-largest economy after the 
United States, and some analysts predict that it could become the largest within the next five 
years or so. On a per capita basis (a common measurement of a nation’s standard of living), 
however, China is significantly less developed than the United States.  
China’s rapid economic growth has led to a substantial increase in bilateral commercial ties with 
the United States. According to U.S. trade data, total trade between the two countries grew from 
$5 billion in 1980 to an estimated $562 billion in 2013. China is currently the United States’ 
second-largest trading partner, its third-largest export market, and its largest source of imports. 
Many U.S. companies have extensive operations in China in order to sell their products in the 
booming Chinese market and to take advantage of lower-cost labor for export-oriented 
manufacturing.2 These operations have helped some U.S. firms to remain internationally 
competitive and have supplied U.S. consumers with a variety of low-cost goods. China’s large-
scale purchases of U.S. Treasury securities (which totaled $1.3 trillion as of April 2014) have 
enabled the federal government to fund its budget deficits, which help keep U.S. interest rates 
relatively low.3 
However, the emergence of China as a major economic power has raised concern among many 
U.S. policy makers. Some claim that China uses unfair trade practices (such as an undervalued 
currency and subsidies given to domestic producers) to flood U.S. markets with low-cost goods, 
and that such practices threaten American jobs, wages, and living standards. Others contend that 
China’s growing use of industrial policies to promote and protect certain domestic Chinese 
industries or firms favored by the government, and its failure to take effective action against 
widespread infringement of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR) in China, threaten to 
undermine the competitiveness of U.S. IP-intensive industries. In addition, while China has 
become a large and growing market for U.S. exports, critics contend that numerous trade and 
investment barriers limit opportunities for U.S. firms to sell in China, or force them to set up 
production facilities in China as the price of doing business there. Other concerns relating to 
China’s economic growth include its growing demand for energy and raw materials and its 
emergence as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gasses.  
The Chinese government views a growing economy as vital to maintaining social stability. 
However, China faces a number of major economic challenges which could dampen future 
growth, including distortive economic policies that have resulted in over-reliance on fixed 
investment and exports for economic growth (rather than on consumer demand), government 
support for state-owned firms, a weak banking system, widening income gaps, growing pollution, 
                                                 
1 China’s economic reform process began in December 1978 when the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of the Communist Party adopted Deng Xiaoping’s economic proposals. Implementation of the reforms 
began in 1979.  
2 Some companies use China as part of their global supply chain for manufactured parts, which are then exported and 
assembled elsewhere. Other firms have shifted the production of finished products from other countries (mainly in 
Asia) to China; they import parts and materials into China for final assembly.  
3 See CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison.  
T
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and the relative lack of the rule of law in China. The Chinese government has acknowledged 
these problems and has pledged to address them by implementing policies to boost consumer 
spending, expand social safety net coverage, and encourage the development of less-polluting 
industries.  
This report provides background on China’s economic rise; describes its current economic 
structure; identifies the challenges China faces to maintain economic growth; and discusses the 
challenges, opportunities, and implications of China’s economic rise for the United States. 
The History of China’s Economic Development 
China’s Economy Prior to Reforms 
Prior to 1979, China, under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, maintained a centrally 
planned, or command, economy. A large share of the country’s economic output was directed and 
controlled by the state, which set production goals, controlled prices, and allocated resources 
throughout most of the economy. During the 1950s, all of China’s individual household farms 
were collectivized into large communes. To support rapid industrialization, the central 
government undertook large-scale investments in physical and human capital during the 1960s 
and 1970s. As a result, by 1978 nearly three-fourths of industrial production was produced by 
centrally controlled, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), according to centrally planned output 
targets. Private enterprises and foreign-invested firms were generally barred. A central goal of the 
Chinese government was to make China’s economy relatively self-sufficient. Foreign trade was 
generally limited to obtaining only those goods that could not be made or obtained in China. 
Government policies kept the Chinese economy relatively stagnant and inefficient, mainly 
because most aspects of the economy were managed and run by the central government (and thus 
there were few profit incentives for firms, workers, and farmers), competition was virtually 
nonexistent, foreign trade and investment flows were mainly limited to Soviet bloc countries, and 
price and production controls caused widespread distortions in the economy. Chinese living 
standards were substantially lower than those of many other developing countries. The Chinese 
government in 1978 (shortly after the death of Chairman Mao in 1976) decided to break with its 
Soviet-style economic policies by gradually reforming the economy according to free market 
principles and opening up trade and investment with the West, in the hope that this would 
significantly increase economic growth and raise living standards. As Chinese leader Deng 
Xiaoping, the architect of China’s economic reforms, put it: “Black cat, white cat, what does it 
matter what color the cat is as long as it catches mice?”4 
The Introduction of Economic Reforms 
Beginning in 1979, China launched several economic reforms. The central government initiated 
price and ownership incentives for farmers, which enabled them to sell a portion of their crops on 
the free market. In addition, the government established four special economic zones along the 
coast for the purpose of attracting foreign investment, boosting exports, and importing high 
                                                 
4 This reference appears to have meant that it did not matter whether an economic policy was considered to be 
“capitalist” or “socialist,” what really mattered was whether that policy would boost the economy.  
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technology products into China. Additional reforms, which followed in stages, sought to 
decentralize economic policymaking in several sectors, especially trade. Economic control of 
various enterprises was given to provincial and local governments, which were generally allowed 
to operate and compete on free market principles, rather than under the direction and guidance of 
state planning. In addition, citizens were encouraged to start their own businesses. Additional 
coastal regions and cities were designated as open cities and development zones, which allowed 
them to experiment with free market reforms and to offer tax and trade incentives to attract 
foreign investment. In addition, state price controls on a wide range of products were gradually 
eliminated. Trade liberalization was also a major key to China’s economic success. Removing 
trade barriers encouraged greater competition and attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows. China’s gradual implementation of economic reforms sought to identify which policies 
produced favorable economic outcomes (and which did not) so that they could be implemented in 
other parts of the country, a process Deng Xiaoping reportedly referred to as “crossing the river 
by touching the stones.”5  
China’s Economic Growth and Reforms: 1979-the Present 
Since the introduction of economic reforms, China’s economy has grown substantially faster than 
during the pre-reform period. According to the Chinese government, from 1953 to 1978, real 
annual GDP growth was estimated at 6.7%,6 although many analysts claim that Chinese economic 
data during this period are highly questionable because government officials often exaggerated 
production levels for a variety of political reasons.7 Economist Agnus Maddison estimated 
China’s average annual real GDP during this period at 4.4%.8  
China’s economy suffered economic downturns during the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, 
including during the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1960 (which led to a massive famine and 
reportedly the deaths of tens of millions of people) and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 
1976 (which caused political chaos and greatly disrupted the economy). Since 1979, China’s 
average annual real GDP has grown by nearly 10% (see Figure 1). This has meant that, on 
average, China has been able to double the size of its economy in real terms every eight years.  
The global economic slowdown, which began in 2008, impacted the Chinese economy (especially 
the export sector). China’s real GDP growth fell from 14.2% in 2007 to 9.6% in 2008, and slowed 
to 9.2% in 2009. In response, the Chinese government implemented a large economic stimulus 
package and an expansive monetary policy. These measures boosted domestic investment and 
consumption and helped prevent a sharp economic slowdown in China. From 2009 to 2011, 
China’s real GDP growth averaged 9.6%. China’s economy has slowed in recent years—real GDP 
                                                 
5 Many analysts contend that Deng’s push to implement economic reforms was largely motivated by a belief that the 
resulting economic growth would ensure that the Communist Party stayed in power.  
6 Chinability, GDP Growth in China, 1952-2011, at http://www.chinability.com/GDP.htm.  
7 During the Great Leap Forward, local Chinese officials are believed to have often exaggerated agricultural production 
to prove their ability to implement Mao’s economic policies in order to advance their careers or to avoid getting into 
political trouble with Beijing. Central government officials may have also exaggerated China’s economic statistics in 
order to illustrate the “success” of the government’s economic policies. 
8 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 
960-2030, by Angus Maddison, 2007. 
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grew by 7.7 in 2012 and 2013. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has projected that China’s 
real GDP growth will average 7.0% from 2014 to 2019.9  
Figure 1. Chinese Real GDP Growth: 1979-2013 
(percent) 
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and official Chinese government data. 
Causes of China’s Economic Growth 
Economists generally attribute much of China’s rapid economic growth to two main factors: 
large-scale capital investment (financed by large domestic savings and foreign investment) and 
rapid productivity growth. These two factors appear to have gone together hand in hand. 
Economic reforms led to higher efficiency in the economy, which boosted output and increased 
resources for additional investment in the economy. 
China has historically maintained a high rate of savings. When reforms were initiated in 1979, 
domestic savings as a percentage of GDP stood at 32%. However, most Chinese savings during 
this period were generated by the profits of SOEs, which were used by the central government for 
domestic investment. Economic reforms, which included the decentralization of economic 
production, led to substantial growth in Chinese household savings as well as corporate savings. 
As a result, China’s gross savings as a percentage of GDP is the highest among major economies. 
The large level of savings has enabled China to substantially boost domestic investment. In fact, 
                                                 
9 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014. 
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China’s gross domestic savings levels far exceed its domestic investment levels, which have made 
China a large net global lender. 
Several economists have concluded that productivity gains (i.e., increases in efficiency) have 
been another major factor in China’s rapid economic growth. The improvements to productivity 
were caused largely by a reallocation of resources to more productive uses, especially in sectors 
that were formerly heavily controlled by the central government, such as agriculture, trade, and 
services. For example, agricultural reforms boosted production, freeing workers to pursue 
employment in the more productive manufacturing sector. China’s decentralization of the 
economy led to the rise of non-state enterprises (such as private firms), which tended to pursue 
more productive activities than the centrally-controlled SOEs and were more market-oriented and 
more efficient. Additionally, a greater share of the economy (mainly the export sector) was 
exposed to competitive forces. Local and provincial governments were allowed to establish and 
operate various enterprises without interference from the government. In addition, FDI in China 
brought with it new technology and processes that boosted efficiency.  
However, as China’s technological development begins to approach that of major developed 
countries (i.e., through its adsorption of foreign technology), its level of productivity gains, and 
thus, real GDP growth, could slow significantly from its historic levels unless China becomes a 
major center for new technology and innovation and/or implements new comprehensive 
economic reforms. Several developing economies (notably several in Asia and Latin America) 
experienced rapid economic development and growth during the 1960s and 1970s by 
implementing some of the same policies that China has utilized to date to develop its economy, 
such as measures to boost exports and to promote and protect certain industries. However, at 
some point in their development, some of these countries began to experience economic 
stagnation (or much slower growth compared to previous levels) over a sustained period of time, 
a phenomenon described by economists as the “middle-income trap.”10 This means that several 
developing (low-income) economies were able to transition to a middle income economy, but 
because they were unable to sustain high levels of productivity gains (in part because they could 
not address structural inefficiencies in the economy), they were unable to transition to a high-
income economy.11 China may be at a similar crossroads now.12 The Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) projects that China’s real GDP growth will slow considerably in the years ahead, averaging 
6.1% from 2014 to 2020, and 2.3% from 2021 to 2030 (Figure 2).13  
The Chinese government has indicated its desire to move away from its current economic model 
of fast growth at any cost to more “smart” economic growth, which seeks to reduce reliance on 
energy-intensive and high-polluting industries and rely more on high technology, green energy, 
and services. China also has indicated it wants to obtain more balanced economic growth. (These 
issues are discussed in more detail later in the report.) 
                                                 
10 Japan was able to become a high-income economy, but since the mid-1980s, its economic growth has been relatively 
stagnant. See CRS Report RL30176, Japan's "Economic Miracle": What Happened?, by William H. Cooper. 
11 These designations are based on World Bank per capita GDP measurements. 
12 For a discussion of this issue, see the World Bank, China 2030, 2013, p. 12, at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/03/27/000350881_20130327163105/Rendered/PDF/
762990PUB0china0Box374372B00PUBLIC0.pdf. 
13 Note, long-term economic projections should be viewed with caution.  
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Figure 2. Projections of U.S. and Chinese Annual Real GDP Growth Rates: 2014-2030 
(percent) 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Note: Long-range economic projections should be viewed with caution. 
Measuring the Size of China’s Economy 
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has led many analysts to speculate if and when China 
will overtake the United States as the “world’s largest economic power.” The “actual” size of 
China’s economy has been a subject of extensive debate among economists. Measured in U.S. 
dollars using nominal exchange rates, China’s GDP in 2013 was $9.3 trillion, about 55% the size 
of the U.S. economy.14 The per capita GDP (a common measurement of a country’s living 
standards) of China was $6,900, which was 18% the size of Japan’s level and 13% that of the 
United States (see Table 1). 
Many economists contend that using nominal exchange rates to convert Chinese data (or that of 
other countries) into U.S. dollars fails to reflect the true size of China’s economy and living 
standards relative to the United States. Nominal exchange rates simply reflect the prices of 
foreign currencies vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and such measurements exclude differences in the 
prices for goods and services across countries. To illustrate, one U.S. dollar exchanged for local 
currency in China would buy more goods and services there than it would in the United States. 
This is because prices for goods and services in China are generally lower than they are in the 
United States. Conversely, prices for goods and services in Japan are generally higher than they 
are in the United States (and China). Thus, one dollar exchanged for local Japanese currency 
would buy fewer goods and services there than it would in the United States. Economists attempt 
to develop estimates of exchange rates based on their actual purchasing power relative to the 
                                                 
14 On a nominal dollar basis, China overtook Japan in 2010 to become the world’s second-largest economy (after the 
United States).  
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dollar in order to make more accurate comparisons of economic data across countries, usually 
referred to as purchasing power parity (PPP).  
The PPP exchange rate increases the (estimated) measurement of China’s economy and its per 
capita GDP. According to the EIU, which uses World Bank data, prices for goods and services in 
China are about 45% the level they are in the United States. Adjusting for this price differential 
raises the value of China’s 2013 GDP from $9.3 trillion (nominal dollars) to $16.1 trillion (on a 
PPP basis).15 This would indicate that China’s economy is 95.9% the size of the U.S. economy. 
China’s share of global GDP on a PPP basis rose from 3.7% in 1990 to 18.2% in 2013 (the U.S. 
share of global GDP peaked at 24.3% in 1999 and declined to 19.0% in 2013). 
Many economic analysts predict that on a PPP basis China will soon overtake the United States as 
the world’s largest economy. The EIU, for example, projects this will occur in 2014 (see Figure 
3), and that by 2030, China’s economy could be 36.1% larger than that of the United States.16 
This would not be the first time in history that China was the world’s largest economy (see text 
box).  
 
The Decline and Rise of China’s Economy
According to a study by economist Angus Maddison, China was the world’s largest economy in 1820, accounting for 
an estimated 32.9% of global GDP. However, foreign and civil wars, internal strife, weak and ineffective governments, 
natural disasters (some of which were man-made), and distortive economic policies caused China’s share of global 
GDP on a PPP basis to shrink significantly. By 1952, China’s share of global GDP had fallen to 5.2%, and by 1978, it slid 
to 4.9%.17 The adoption of economic reforms by China in the late 1970s led to a surge in China’s economic growth 
and has helped restore China as a major global economic power. 
Source: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long 
Run, 960-2030, by Angus Maddison, 2007.  
 
The PPP measurement also raises China’s 2013 nominal per capita GDP (from $6,900) to 
$11,940, which was 22.5% of the U.S. level. The EIU projects that, even by the year 2030, U.S. 
living standards will be close to three times greater than those in China. Thus, although China 
could become the world’s largest economy in a few years on a PPP basis, it will likely take many 
years for its living standards to approach U.S. levels.18  
                                                 
15 In other words, the PPP data reflect what the value of China’s goods and services would be if they were sold in the 
United States. 
16 However, such long-term economic projections should be viewed with caution. Even short-term economic 
projections differ across organizations. 
17 In comparison, the U.S. share of global GDP was estimated to have risen from 1.8% in 1820 to 27.5% in 1952, but 
declined to 21.6% by 1978. 
18 EIU database, surveyed on June 29, 2014. 
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Table 1. Comparisons of Chinese, Japanese, and U.S. GDP and Per Capita GDP 
in Nominal U.S. Dollars and a Purchasing Power Parity Basis: 2013 
 China Japan United States 
Nominal GDP ($ billions) 9,323 4,901 16,800 
GDP in PPP ($ billions) 16,119 4,611 16,800 
Nominal Per Capita GDP ($)  6,900 38,550 53,104 
Per Capita GDP in PPP ($) 11,940 36,260 53104 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates using World Bank PPP data. 
Figure 3. Projections for Chinese and U.S. GDP on a PPP Basis: 2000-2030 
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Note: Long-term economic projections should be viewed with caution. 
China as the World’s Largest Manufacturer 
China has emerged as the world’s largest manufacturer according to the United Nations. Figure 4 
lists estimates of the gross value added of manufacturing in China, the United States, and Japan 
expressed in U.S. dollars for 2004 to 2012. Gross value added data reflect the actual value of 
manufacturing that occurred in the country (i.e., they subtract the value of intermediate inputs and 
raw materials used in production). These data indicate that China overtook Japan as the world’s 
second-largest manufacturer on a gross value added basis in 2006 and the United States in 2010. 
In 2012, the value of China’s manufacturing on a gross value added basis was 28.2% higher than 
that in the United States. Manufacturing plays a considerably more important role in the Chinese 
economy than it does for the United States and Japan. In 2011, China’s gross valued added 
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manufacturing was equal to 30.5% of GDP, compared to 12.3% for the United States and 18.7% 
for Japan.19 
In its 2013 Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index, Deloitte (an international consulting 
firm) ranked China first in manufacturing in 2013 and projected it would remain so in five years 
(the United States ranked third in 2013 and was projected to rank fifth in 2018). The report stated 
that “China’s competitiveness is bolstered by conducive policy environment either encouraging or 
directly funding investments in science and technology, employee education and infrastructure 
development,” and further stated that “the landscape for competitive manufacturing is in the 
midst of a massive power shift, in which twentieth-century manufacturing stalwarts like the 
United States, Germany and Japan will be challenged to maintain their competitive edge to 
emerging nations, including China.”20 
Figure 4. Gross Value Added Manufacturing in China, the United States, and Japan: 
2004-2012 
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Source: United Nations, UNdata. 
Changes in China’s Wage Advantage 
China’s huge population and relatively low wage rates gave it a significant competitive advantage 
when economic reforms and trade liberalization were first begun by the government in the late 
1970s. However, this advantage appears to be eroding as wages in China have risen in recent 
years. From 2000 to 2013, Chinese average real wages grew at an average annual rate of 11.4%. 
As indicated in Figure 5, China’s average monthly wages in 2000 were $94 compared with $311 
                                                 
19 United Nations, UNdata. 
20 Deloitte, Press Release, January 22, 2013, available at http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_CN/cn/Pressroom/pr/
105280463d16c310VgnVCM2000003356f70aRCRD.htm. The index was based on a survey of 550 chief executive 
officers and senior leaders in manufacturing companies around the world.  
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per month for Mexico (China’s wages were 30.2% the size of Mexican wages).21 However, in 
2013, China’s average monthly wages at $694 were 50.5% higher than those in Mexico ($461). In 
2000, China’s average wages were 92% higher than those than Vietnam, but by 2013, they were 
168% higher. A 2012 survey by the American Chamber of Commerce of its member companies in 
China reported that 39% of respondents said that labor costs ranked as the biggest business risk 
facing their China operations (up from 23% in 2011) and 82% stated that rising labor costs were 
affecting their China operations.22 In addition, 89% of respondents said that China was losing its 
competitive edge “to some degree” or “to a great degree” due to rising costs.23 Rising labor costs 
are one of the main reasons why the Chinese government has focused on boosting the nation’s 
innovation and productivity levels.24  
Figure 5. Average Monthly Wages for Selected Countries: 2000-2013 
(U.S. dollars) 
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Notes: Because data are listed in U.S. dollars rather than local currency, changes to monthly 
wages may also partially reflect changes to exchange rates with the U.S. dollar. However, such 
data reflect average labor costs that U.S.-invested firms in China might face. 
                                                 
21 Wage data are from the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
22 This issue ranked third overall among respondents as the biggest risk, after the Chinese economic slowdown and the 
global economic slowdown. Source: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2012 China Business Climate Survey Report, March 
26, 2012, p. 10.  
23 Rising labor costs in China reflect a number of factors, including changing demographics in China (such as growing 
labor shortages), new social insurance measures, and efforts by the government to boost the minimum wage and 
improve working conditions, in part to boost domestic consumption.  
24 Despite rising labor costs, China continues to enjoy a significant excess supply of labor, estimated by the IMF to be 
currently at 150 million. However, that level is projected to fall to around 30 million by 2020. See IMF, 2012 Article IV 
Report, People’s Republic of China, July 2012, p. 8. 
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China 
China’s trade and investment reforms and incentives led to a surge in FDI beginning in the early 
1990s. Such flows have been a major source of China’s productivity gains and rapid economic 
and trade growth. There were reportedly 445,244 foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) registered in 
China in 2010, employing 55.2 million workers or 15.9% of the urban workforce.25 As indicated 
in Figure 6, FIEs account for a significant share of China’s industrial output. That level rose from 
2.3% in 1990 to a high of 35.9% in 2003, but fell to 25.9% as of 2011.26 In addition, FIEs are 
responsible for a significant level of China’s foreign trade. In 2013, FIEs in China accounted for 
47.3% of China’s exports and 44.8% of its imports, although this level was down from its peak in 
2006 when FIEs’ share of Chinese exports and imports was 58.2% and 59.7%, respectively, as 
indicated in Figure 7.27 FIEs in China dominate China’s high technology exports. From 2002 to 
2010, the share of China’s high tech exports by FIEs rose from 79% to 82%. During the same 
period, the share of China’s high tech exports by wholly owned foreign firms (which excludes 
foreign joint ventures with Chinese firms) rose from 55% to 67%. 
Figure 6. Industrial Output by Foreign-Invested Firms in China as a Share 
of National Output Total: 1990-2011 
(percent) 
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Source: Invest in China (http://www.fdi.gov.cn) and China’s 2012 Statistical Yearbook. 
                                                 
25 China 2012 Statistical Yearbook. 
26 Industrial output is defined by the Chinese government as the total volume of final industrial products produced and 
industrial services provided during a given period. Source: China 2012 Statistical Yearbook. 
27 For January-June 2014, the shares for exports and imports were 46.6% and 45.1%, respectively. 
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Figure 7. Share of China’s Exports and Imports 
Attributed to Foreign-Invested Enterprises in China: 1990-June 2014 
(percent) 
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Source: Invest in China (http://www.fdi.gov.cn). 
According to the United Nations, annual FDI flows to China grew from $2 billion 1985 to an 
estimated $121 billion in 2013 (see Figure 8), and may have reached $127 billion in 2013. The 
U.N. further estimates the stock of FDI in China through 2012 at $832.9 billion.28 As indicated in 
Figure 9, China was the world’s second-largest destination for FDI flows in 2013 (after the 
United States).29 
According to Chinese government data on non-financial FDI inflows, the largest sources of 
cumulative FDI in China for 1979-2013 were Hong Kong (47.0%),30 the British Virgin Islands 
(BVI), Japan, the United States, and Taiwan (see Table 2).31 The largest sources of non-financial 
FDI inflows into China in 2013 were Hong Kong (67% of total), Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, and 
the United States. According to Chinese data, annual U.S. non-financial FDI flows to China 
peaked at $5.4 billion in 2002 (10.2% of total FDI in China). In 2013, they were $3.4 billion or 
2.9% of total FDI flows to China (see Figure 10).32 The stock of U.S. non-financial FDI in China 
(based on Chinese data) was $74.6 billion through 2013.33 
                                                 
28 U.N. data differ from Chinese data, in part because Chinese data include only nonfinancial FDI. 
29 United Nations, Global Investment Trends Monitor, No. 11, January 28, 2014. 
30 Much of the FDI originating from Hong Kong may originate from other foreign investors, such as Taiwan. In 
addition, some Chinese investors might be using these locations to shift funds overseas in order to re-invest in China to 
take advantage of preferential investment policies (this practice is often referred to as “round-tipping”). Thus, the actual 
level of FDI in China may be overstated.  
31 Cumulative values are totals of the data collected each year, are not adjusted for inflation, and do not reflect 
divestment that may have occurred. 
32 U.S. data on bilateral FDI flows with China differ significantly with Chinese data. For additional info on bilateral 
FDI flows based on U.S. data, see CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison. 
33 These data are accumulated annul data on FDI flows reported by the Chinese government and do not reflect the 
(continued...) 
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Figure 8. Annual FDI Flows to China: 1985-2013 
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Source: The United Nations.  
Note: UN data differ from that of official Chinese data. 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
historic-cost value of current U.S. FDI in China.  
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Figure 9. Largest Recipients of Global FDI Inflows in 2013 
($ billions) 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment. 
Note: U.N. data on China’s FDI inflows differ from China’s official data. 
Table 2. Chinese Data on Major Sources of FDI Flows to China: 1979-2013 
($ billions and percentage of total) 
Country 
Estimated Cumulative Utilized  
FDI: 1979-2013 Utilized FDI in 2013 
Amount % of Total Amount % of Total 
Total 1,453.3 100.0 117.6 100.0 
Hong Kong 682.8 47.0 78.3 66.6 
British Virgin Islands* 111.8 7.7 NA  NA 
Japan 94.4 6.5 7.1 6.0 
United States 74.6 5.1 3.4 2.9 
Taiwan  70.1 4.8 5.2 4.4 
Singapore 67.2 4.6 7.3 6.2 
South Korea 56.1 3.9 3.1 2.6 
Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce and Chinese Statistical Yearbook.  
Notes: Ranked by cumulative top seven sources of FDI in China through 2013. * Data for the British Virgin 
Islands are through 2010. China’s cumulative data are the sum of annual data and do not reflect disinvestment or 
current value.  
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Figure 10. Chinese Data on Annual U.S. FDI Flows to China: 1985-2013 
($ millions) 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
 
Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce and Chinese Yearbook, various years.  
Notes: Chinese and U.S. data on bilateral FDI flows differ sharply because of different methodologies used. 
China’s Growing FDI Outflows 
A key aspect of China’s economic modernization and growth strategy during the 1980s and 1990s 
was to attract FDI into China to help boost the development of domestic firms. Investment by 
Chinese firms abroad was sharply restricted. However, in 2000, China’s leaders initiated a new 
“go global” strategy, which sought to encourage Chinese firms (primarily SOEs) to invest 
overseas. One key factor driving this investment is China’s massive accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves. Traditionally, a significant level of those reserves has been invested in 
relatively safe, but low-yielding, assets, such as U.S. Treasury securities. On September 29, 2007, 
the Chinese government officially launched the China Investment Corporation (CIC) in an effort 
to seek more profitable returns on its foreign exchange reserves and diversify away from its U.S. 
dollar holdings. The CIC was originally funded at $200 billion, making it one of the world’s 
largest sovereign wealth funds.34 Another factor behind the government’s drive to encourage more 
outward FDI flows has been to obtain natural resources, such as oil and minerals, deemed by the 
government as necessary to sustain China’s rapid economic growth.35 Finally, the Chinese 
government has indicated its goal of developing globally competitive Chinese firms with their 
own brands. Investing in foreign firms, or acquiring them, is viewed as a method for Chinese 
                                                 
34 See CRS Report RL34337, China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, by Michael F. Martin. 
35 Chinese oil and mineral companies are dominated by SOEs.  
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firms to obtain technology, management skills, and often, internationally recognized brands, 
needed to help Chinese firms become more globally competitive. For example, in April 2005, 
Lenovo Group Limited, a Chinese computer company, purchased IBM Corporation’s personal 
computer division for $1.75 billion.36 Similarly, overseas FDI in new plants and businesses is 
viewed as developing multinational Chinese firms with production facilities and R&D operations 
around the world. 
China has become a significant source of global FDI outflows, which, according to the U.N. rose 
from $2.7 billion in 2002 to $101 billion in 2013 (see Figure 11). China ranked as the third-
largest source of global FDI in 2013 (up from sixth in 2011).37 The stock of China’s outward FDI 
through 2013 is estimated at $512 billion.38  
China’s FDI outflows by destination for 2012 are listed in Table 3. These data indicate that the 
largest destinations of total Chinese FDI through 2012 were Hong Kong (57.5% of total), the 
BVI, the Cayman Islands, the United States, and Australia. In terms of Chinese FDI flows in 
2012, the largest recipients were Hong Kong (58.3% of total), the United States, Kazakhstan, the 
United Kingdom, and the BVI. 
Table 3. Major Destinations of Chinese Overseas Direct Investment in 2012: 
Flows and Stock 
($ billions) 
Destination  FDI Flows in 2012  
Stock of FDI through 
2012 
Share of FDI Stock 
through 2012 (%) 
Hong Kong 51.2 306.4 57.5 
British Virgin Islands 2.2 30.9 5.8 
Cayman Islands 0.8 30.1 5.7 
United States 4.0 17.1 3.3 
Australia 2.2 13.9 2.6 
Singapore 1.5 12.4 2.3 
Luxembourg 1.1 9.0 1.7 
Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 
Note: Ranked according to the top seven destinations of Chinese FDI outflows through 2012. 
                                                 
36 The Chinese government is believed to be Lenovo’s largest shareholder. For additional information on China’s FDI 
flows to the United States, see CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison. 
37 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2014, July 3, 2014. 
38 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
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Figure 11. China’s Annual FDI Outflows: 2000-2013 
($ billions) 
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Source: Data for 2000-2012 are estimates made by the United Nations. Data for 
2013 are from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and exclude financial FDI outflows. 
Note: U.N. data on Chinese FDI differ from official Chinese data. 
China’s Merchandise Trade Patterns 
Economic reforms and trade and investment liberalization have helped transform China into a 
major trading power. Chinese merchandise exports rose from $14 billion in 1979 to $2.2 trillion 
in 2013, while merchandise imports grew from $18 billion to $1.9 trillion (see Table 4 and 
Figure 12).  
From 1990 to 2013, the annual growth of China’s exports and imports averaged 18.5% and 
17.3%, respectively (see Figure 13).39 China’s exports and imports in 2013 grew by 7.8% and 
7.3%, respectively. During the first half of 2014, China’s exports and imports grew by 0.9% and 
1.7% over same period in 2013. China’s merchandise trade surplus grew sharply from 2004 to 
2008, rising from $32 billion to $297 billion. That surplus fell each year from 2009 to 2011, 
dropping to $158 billion. However, in 2012, China’s trade surplus rose to $233 billion, and in 
2013 it increased to $261 billion. 
In 2009, China overtook Germany to become both the world’s largest merchandise exporter and 
the second-largest merchandise importer (after the United States). In 2012, China overtook the 
United States as the world’s largest merchandise trading economy.40 As indicated in Figure 14, 
China’s share of global merchandise exports more than tripled from 2000 to 2013, rising from 
                                                 
39 Chinese exports and imports dropped sharply in 2009 (over 2008 levels) because of the global economic slowdown. 
By 2010, China’s trade had recovered and exceeded pre-crisis levels.  
40 In 2013, China became the largest trading economy for goods and services. 
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3.8% to 12.1%;41 the World Bank projects this figure could increase to 20% by 2030.42 
Merchandise trade surpluses, large-scale foreign investment, and large purchases of foreign 
currencies to maintain its exchange rate with the dollar and other currencies have enabled China 
to become by far the world’s largest holder of foreign exchange reserves at nearly $3.9 trillion as 
of March 2014. 
Table 4. China’s Merchandise World Trade: 1979-2014* 
($ billions) 
Year Exports Imports Trade Balance 
1979 13.7 15.7 –2.0 
1980 18.1 19.5 –1.4 
1985 27.3 42.5 –15.3 
1990 62.9 53.9 9.0 
1995 148.8 132.1 16.7 
2000 249.2 225.1 24.1 
2001 266.2 243.6 22.6 
2002 325.6 295.2 30.4 
2003 438.4 412.8 25.6 
2004 593.4 561.4 32.0 
2005 762.0 660.1 101.9 
2006 969.1 791.5 177.6 
2007 1,218.0 955.8 262.2 
2008  1,428.9 1,131.5 297.4 
2009 1,202.0 1,003.9 198.2 
2010 1,578.4 1,393.9 184.5 
2011 1,899.3 1,741.4 157.9 
2012  2,050.1 1,817.3 232.8 
2013  2,210.7 1,949.3 261.4 
2014 (est.) 2,230.6 1,982.4 248.2 
Source: Global Trade Atlas. 
Notes: Chinese data often differ from those of its trading partners. *Estimates for 2014 are based on actual 
data for January-June 2014. 
                                                 
41 Economist Intelligence Unit, Data Tools. 
42 The World Bank, China 2030, Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society, 2012, p. 14. 
Hereinafter referred to as World Bank, China 2030. 
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Figure 12. China’s Merchandise Trade: 2000-2013  
($ billions) 
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Source: World Trade Atlas. 
Note: Chinese data often differ from those of its trading partners. 
Figure 13. Annual Change in China’s Merchandise Exports and Imports: 1990-2014  
(percent) 
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Source: Global Trade Atlas using official Chinese data.  
Note: 2014 data are January-June 2014, year-on-year change. 
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Figure 14. China’s Share of Global Merchandise Exports: 1990-2013 
($ billions) 
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
China’s Major Trading Partners 
Table 5 lists official Chinese trade data on its major trading partners in 2013 (based on total 
trade), which included the 28 countries that make up the European Union (EU28), the United 
States, the 10 nations that constitute the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and 
Japan.43 China’s top three export markets were Hong Kong, the United States, and the EU28, 
while its top sources for imports were the EU28, ASEAN, and South Korea. According to 
Chinese data, it maintained large trade surpluses with Hong Kong ($369 billion), the United 
States ($222 billion), and the EU28 ($119 billion), and reported large trade imbalances with 
Taiwan (-$116 billion) and South Korea (-$92 billion). China’s trade data differ significantly from 
those of many of its trading partners. These differences appear to be largely caused by how 
China’s trade via Hong Kong is counted in official Chinese trade data. China treats a large share 
of its exports through Hong Kong as Chinese exports to Hong Kong for statistical purposes, while 
many countries that import Chinese products through Hong Kong generally attribute their origin 
to China for statistical purposes, including the United States.44 
                                                 
43 ASEAN members include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
44 See CRS Report RS22640, What’s the Difference?—Comparing U.S. and Chinese Trade Data, by Michael F. 
Martin. 
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Table 5. China’s Major Trading Partners in 2013 
($ billions) 
Country Total Trade 
Chinese 
Exports 
Chinese 
Imports 
China’s Trade 
Balance 
European Union 559 339 220 119 
United States 514 368 146 222 
ASEAN 443 244 199 45 
Hong Kong 401 385 16 369 
Japan  312 150 162 -12 
South Korea 274 91 183 -92 
Taiwan 198 41 157 -116 
Total Chinese Trade 4,160 2,211 1,949 262 
Sources: Global Trade Atlas and World Trade Atlas. 
Notes: Rankings according to China’s total trade in 2013. China’s bilateral trade data often differ substantially 
from that of its trading partners. 
Major Chinese Trade Commodities 
China’s abundance of low-cost labor has made it internationally competitive in many low-cost, 
labor-intensive manufactures. As a result, manufactured products constitute a significant share of 
China’s trade. A substantial amount of China’s imports is comprised of parts and components that 
are assembled into finished products, such as consumer electronic products and computers, and 
then exported. Often, the value-added to such products in China by Chinese workers is relatively 
small compared to the total value of the product when it is shipped abroad.  
China’s top 10 exports and imports in 2013 are listed in Table 6 and Table 7, respectively, using 
the harmonized tariff system (HTS) on a two-digit level. Major exports included electrical 
machinery,45 machinery (including computers), knit apparel, and furniture and bedding while 
major imports included electrical machinery, mineral fuel, machinery, and ores. 
                                                 
45 This includes electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television 
image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles. 
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Table 6. Major Chinese Exports: 2013 
($ billions) 
HS Code Description $ billions 
Percentage 
of Total 
2012/2011
 % Change 
 World 2,211 100.0 7.8 
85 Electrical machinery  562 25.4 15.2 
84 Machinery 383 17.3 1.9 
61 Knit apparel 97 4.4 11.2 
94 Furniture and bedding 86 3.9 11.0 
90 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring  
checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments 
and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof 
75 3.4 2.6 
62 Woven apparel 68 3.1 11.5 
39 Plastics 62 2.8 11.7 
87 Vehicles, except railway (mainly auto parts, motorcycles, 
trucks, and bicycles)  
59 2.7 6.2 
73 Iron and steel products 57 2.6 2.1 
64 Footwear 51 2.3 8.4 
Source: World Trade Atlas, using official Chinese statistics. 
Note: Top 10 exports in 2013, two-digit level, harmonized tariff system. 
Table 7. Major Chinese Imports: 2013 
($ billions) 
HS Code Description  $ billions 
Percentage of  
 Total 
2012/2011
 % change 
 World 1,949 100.0 7.3 
85 Electrical machinery 439 22.5 15.1 
27 Mineral fuel, oil etc. 314 16.1 0.9 
84 Machinery 171 8.8 -6.2 
26 Ores, slag, and ash 148 7.6 10.9 
90 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring,  
checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments  
 and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof 
108 5.5 1.3 
98 Special Classification 105 5.4 52.3 
87 Vehicles, not railway (mainly autos and parts) 74 3.8 5.0 
39 Plastics 72 3.7 4.2 
29 Organic chemicals 66 3.4 8.3 
74 Copper and articles thereof 50 2.6 -7.7 
Source: World Trade Atlas, using official Chinese statistics. 
Note: Top 10 imports in 2013, two-digit level, harmonized tariff schedule. 
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China’s Growing Appetite for Energy 
China’s rapid economic growth has fueled a growing demand for energy, such as petroleum and 
coal, and that demand is becoming an increasingly important factor in determining global energy 
prices. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China overtook the United States in 
2009 as the world’s largest energy user (in comparison, China’s energy use was only half that of 
that of the United States in 2000). According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), China’s oil consumption growth accounted for half of the world’s oil consumption growth 
in 2011.46 According to IEA projections, China’s demand for energy from 2008 (the baseline 
year) to 2035 will account for 30% of the projected increase in global demand for energy during 
this period. By 2035, China is projected to consume 70% more energy than the United States 
(even though, on a per capita basis, China’s energy consumption will be less than half of U.S. 
levels).47 
China is the world’s second-largest consumer of oil products (after the United States) at 10.7 
million barrels per day (bpd) in 2013, and that level is projected to rise to 16.9 million bpd by 
2035.48 China became a net oil importer (i.e., imports minus exports) in 1993. Net oil imports 
grew from 632,000 bpd in 1997 to 5.8 million bpd in 2013 (see Figure 15), making it the world’s 
second-largest net oil importer after the United States.49 In August 2013, the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) projected that China would become the world’s largest net 
importer by October 2013. By 2035, China’s net oil imports per day are projected to exceed 
13 million bpd.50 
                                                 
46 EIA, Country Analysis Brief, China, September 2012, at http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH. 
47 International Energy Agency, 2012 World Energy Outlook, November 2012, available at http://www.iea.org/. 
48 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Forecasts and Analysis, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/forecasting.html. 
49 China overtook Japan as the second-largest net oil importer in 2009. 
50 EIA, International Energy Outlook, September 19, 2011, available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo. 
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Figure 15. China’s Net Oil Imports: 1997-2013 
(millions of barrels per day) 
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Sources: U.S. Energy Administration and China Daily. 
China’s Regional and Bilateral Free Trade Agreements 
The Chinese government has maintained an active policy of boosting trade and investment ties 
around the world, especially with countries in Asia. To that end, China has entered into a number 
of regional and bilateral trade agreements, or is in the process of doing so. China currently has 
free trade agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN, Chile, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Macau, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, and Singapore. China also has an “economic cooperation framework 
agreement” (ECFA) with Taiwan. China is currently in the process of negotiating FTAs with the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (which includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain), Australia, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and the 
Southern African Customs Union (which includes South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
and Swaziland). In May 2012, China, Japan, and South Korea agreed to begin negotiations for an 
FTA in 2012. China has also considered negotiating an FTA with India, but with little progress to 
date.51 In December 2012, China joined with the 10 members of ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, and New Zealand in agreement to begin negotiations toward a Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which, if concluded, could constitute the world’s 
largest free trade bloc.52 China has also expressed interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
                                                 
51 Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China FTA Network, available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/
fta_qianshu.shtml. 
52 The RCEP would include more than 3 billion people, have a combined GDP of $17 trillion. 
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(TPP) negotiations, a proposed FTA that currently includes the United States and 11 other 
countries. 
Major Long-Term Challenges Facing the 
Chinese Economy 
China’s economy has shown remarkable growth over the past several years, and many economists 
project that it will enjoy fairly healthy growth in the near future. However, economists caution 
that these projections are likely to occur only if China continues to make major reforms to its 
economy. Failure to implement such reforms could endanger future growth. They note that 
China’s current economic model has resulted in a number of negative economic (and social) 
outcomes, such as over-reliance on fixed investment and exporting for its economic growth, 
extensive inefficiencies that exist in many sectors (due largely to government industrial policies), 
wide-spread pollution, and growing income inequality, to name a few. Many of China’s economic 
problems and challenges stem from its incomplete transition to a free market economy and from 
imbalances that have resulted from the government’s goal of economic growth at all costs.  
China’s Incomplete Transition to a Market Economy 
Despite China’s three-decade history of widespread economic reforms, Chinese officials contend 
that China is a “socialist-market economy.” This appears to indicate that the government accepts 
and allows the use of free market forces in a number of areas to help grow the economy, but the 
government still plays a major role in the country’s economic development.  
Industrial Policies and SOEs 
According to the World Bank, “China has become one of the world’s most active users of 
industrial policies and administrations.”53 According to one estimate, China’s SOEs may account 
for up of 50% of non-agriculture GDP.54 In addition, although the number of SOEs has declined 
sharply, they continue to dominate a number of sectors (such as petroleum and mining, 
telecommunications, utilities, transportation, and various industrial sectors); are shielded from 
competition; are the main sectors encouraged to invest overseas; and dominate the listings on 
China’s stock indexes.55 One study found that SOEs constituted 50% of the 500 largest 
manufacturing companies in China and 61% of the top 500 service sector enterprises.56 It is 
estimated that there were 154,000 SOEs as of 2008, and while these accounted for only 3.1% of 
                                                 
53 The World Bank, China:2030, p. 114. 
54 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State 
Capitalism in China, by Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, October 26, 2011, p. 1. 
55 The nature of China’s SOEs has become increasing complex. Many SOEs appear to be run like private companies. 
For example, and a number of SOEs have made initial public offerings in China’s stock markets and those in other 
countries (including the United States), although the Chinese government is usually the largest shareholder. It is not 
clear to what extent the Chinese government attempts to influence decisions made by the SOE’s which have become 
shareholding companies.  
56 Xiao Geng, Xiuke Yang, and Anna Janus, State-owned Enterprises in China, Reform Dynamics and Impacts, 2009, 
p. 155. 
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all enterprises in China, they held 30% of the value of corporate assets in the manufacturing and 
services sectors.57 Of the 58 Chinese firms on the 2011 Fortune Global 500 list, 54 were 
identified as having government ownership of 50% or more.58 The World Bank estimates that 
more than one in four SOEs lose money.59  
The Banking System 
China’s banking system is largely controlled by the central government, which attempts to ensure 
that capital (credit) flows to industries deemed by the government to be essential to China’s 
economic development. SOEs are believed to receive preferential credit treatment by government 
banks, while private firms must often pay higher interest rates or obtain credit elsewhere. 
According to one estimate, SOEs accounted for 85% ($1.4 trillion) of all bank loans in 2009.60 In 
addition, the government sets interest rates for depositors at very low rates, often below the rate 
of inflation, which keeps the price of capital relatively low for firms.61 It is believed that 
oftentimes SOEs do not repay their loans, which may have saddled the banks with a large amount 
of nonperforming loans. In addition, local governments are believed to have borrowed 
extensively from state banks shortly after the global economic slowdown began to impact the 
Chinese economy to fund infrastructure and other initiatives. Some contend these measures could 
further add to the amount of nonperforming loans held by the banks. Many analysts contend that 
one of the biggest weaknesses of the banking system is that it lacks the ability to ration and 
allocate credit according to market principles, such as risk assessment.  
Local government debt is viewed as a growing problem in China, largely because of the potential 
impact it could have on the Chinese banking system. During the beginning of the global financial 
slowdown, many Chinese subnational government entities borrowed extensively to help stimulate 
local economies, especially by supporting infrastructure projects. In December 2013, the Chinese 
National Audit Office reported that from the end of 2010 to mid-year 2013, local government 
debt had increased by 67% to nearly $3 trillion.62  
An Undervalued Currency  
China does not allow its currency to float and therefore must make large-scale purchases of 
dollars to keep the exchange rate within certain target levels. Although the renminbi (RMB) has 
appreciated against the dollar in real terms by about 40% since reforms were introduced in July 
2005, some analysts contend that it remains highly undervalued.63 China’s undervalued currency 
makes its exports less expensive, and its imports more expensive, than would occur under a 
                                                 
57 The World Bank, State-Owned Enterprises in China: How Big Are They?, January 19, 2010. 
58 Global 500, The World’s Largest Corporations,” Fortune, July 25, 2011, available at http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/global500/2011/index.html.  
59 World Bank, China 2030, p. 25. 
60 The Economist, State Capitalism’s Global Reach, New Masters of the Universe, How State Enterprise is Spreading, 
January 21, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21542925. 
61 Some economists argue that a significant portion of China’s SOEs could not stay in business if they had to pay a 
market-based interest rate for credit. 
62 The Wall Street Journal, Xi Faces Test over China’s Local Debt; Risks From Debt are Still Controllable, Audit 
Office Says, December 30, 2013. 
63 See CRS Report RS21625, China's Currency Policy: An Analysis of the Economic Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison 
and Marc Labonte.  
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floating exchange rate system. In order to maintain its exchange rate target, the government must 
purchase foreign currency (such as the dollar) by expanding the money supply. This makes it 
much more difficult for the government to use monetary policy to combat inflation.64  
Many economists argue that China’s industrial policies have sharply limited competition and the 
growth of the private sector, caused over-capacity in many industries, and distorted markets by 
artificially lowering the costs of various factor costs (such as capital, water, land, and energy) 
below market levels in order to promote targeted industrial sectors. Such policies have come at 
the expense of other (non-industrial) sectors of the economy, such as services.  
Overdependence on Exporting and Fixed Investment 
A 2009 IMF report estimated that fixed investment related to tradable goods plus net exports 
together accounted for over 60% of China’s GDP growth from 2001 to 2008 (up from 40% from 
1990 to 2000), which was significantly higher than in the G-7 countries (16%), the euro area 
(30%), and the rest of Asia (35%).65 As indicated in Figure 16, from 1990 to 2013, Chinese gross 
savings as a percent of GDP and gross fixed investment as a percent of GDP both increased 
significantly, while private consumption as a percent of GDP declined sharply. In addition, as 
indicated in Figure 17, personal disposable income in China as a share of GDP was lower in 2013 
(43.9%) than it was in 2000 (47.9%).66 China’s gross savings as a percent of GDP and gross fixed 
investment as a percent of GDP are the highest among any of the world’s largest economies, 
while China’s private consumption as a share of GDP is the lowest.67  
Many economists contend that the falling share of private consumption and disposable income 
relative to GDP is largely caused by two main factors: China’s banking policies and the lack of an 
adequate social safety net. The Chinese government places restrictions on the export of capital. 
As a result, Chinese households put a large share of their savings in domestic banks. The Chinese 
government sets the interest rate on deposits. Often this rate is below the rate of inflation, which 
lowers household income. Some economists consider this policy to constitute a transfer of wealth 
from Chinese households to Chinese firms which benefit from low interest rates. This “tax” on 
household income negatively affects household consumption. Secondly, China’s lack of an 
adequate social safety net (such as pensions, health care, unemployment insurance, and 
education) induces households to save a large portion of their income. According to one estimate, 
the average saving rate of urban households relative to their disposable incomes rose from 18% in 
1995 to nearly 29% in 2009.68 Corporations are also a major contributor to the high savings rate 
in China. Many Chinese firms, especially SOEs, do not pay out dividends and thus are able to 
                                                 
64 If Chinese banks raised interest rates in an effort to control inflation, overseas investors might to try to shift funds to 
China (through illegal means) to take advantage of the higher Chinese rates. The Chinese government has had difficulty 
blocking such inflows of “hot money.” Such inflows force the government to boost the money supply to buy up the 
foreign currency necessary to maintain the targeted peg. Expanding the money supply contributes to easy credit 
policies by the banks, which has contributed to overcapacity in a number of sectors, such as steel, and speculative asset 
bubbles (such as in real estate). This often forces the government to use administrative controls to limit credit to certain 
sectors.  
65 Guo, Kai and Papa N’Diaye, Is China’s Export-Oriented Growth Sustainable, IMF Working Paper, August 2009 
66 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
67 Chinese private consumption as a percent of GDP in 2013 was 36.4%. Rates for other countries include the United 
States (at 68.3%), Brazil (62.9%), Japan (61.4%), Germany (57.6%), India (56.1%), and Russia (51.3%). Source: EIU. 
68 VOX, The Puzzle of China’s Rising Household Saving Rate, by Marcos Chamon, Kai Liu, and Eswar Prasad, 
January 18, 2011, available at http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6028. 
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retain most of their earnings. Many economists contend that requiring the SOEs to pay dividends 
could boost private consumption in China. 
Chinese economic policies have resulted in gross fixed investment being the main engine of the 
country’s economic growth for every year from 2000 to 2013. (In 2011 gross fixed investment 
and private consumptions each accounted for 3.0 percentage points; see Figure 16.)69 
Figure 16. Chinese Gross Savings, Gross Fixed Investment, and 
Private Consumption as a Percent of GDP: 1990-2013 
(percent) 
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.  
                                                 
69 The last time private consumption was the largest contributor to GDP was 1999. 
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Figure 17. Chinese Disposable Personal Income as a Percent of GDP: 2000-2013 
(percent)  
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Note: Data for 2013 are estimates. 
Figure 18. Sources of Chinese GDP Growth: 2007-2013 
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Note: Real GDP growth rates for 2007-2013 were as follows: 14.2% in 2007, 9.6% in 2008, 9.2% 
in 2009, 10.4% in 2010, 9.2% in 2011, and 7.7% in both 2012 and 2013. 
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Growing Pollution 
China’s economic growth model has emphasized the growth of heavy industry in China, much of 
which is energy-intensive and high polluting. The level of pollution in China continues to worsen, 
posing serious health risks to the population. The Chinese government often disregards its own 
environmental laws in order to promote rapid economic growth. China’s environmental 
challenges are illustrated by the following incidents and reports: 
• The U.S. Embassy in Beijing, which monitors and reports air quality in China 
based on an air quality index of particle matter (developed by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency) considered to pose a health concern, reported 
that the air quality in Beijing for a majority of the days in January 2013 ranged 
from “unhealthy” to “hazardous” (based on 24-hour exposure) and, on a few 
days, it recorded high readings that were “beyond index.”70 The level of poor air 
quality in Beijing was termed by some in China as “Airpocalypse,” and 
reportedly forced the government to shut down some factories and reduce the 
level of official cars on the road.71 On December 9, 2013, China’s media reported 
that half of China was blanketed by smog.72 The U.S. Consulate General in 
Shanghai reported that were a number of days in December 2013 where its 
measurement of the air quality in Shanghai was hazardous or very unhealthy, and 
during some time periods on December 5, 2013, its readings were “beyond 
index.”  
• In February 2013, China’s Geological Survey reportedly estimated that 90% of 
all Chinese cities had polluted groundwater, with two-thirds having “severely 
polluted” water.73  
• According to a 2012 report by the Asian Development Bank, less than 1% of the 
500 largest cities in China meet the air quality standards recommended by the 
World Health Organization, and 7 of these are ranked among the 10 most 
polluted cities in the world.74  
• The U.S. Entergy Information Administration (EIA) projected in 2011 that by 
2035, China’s carbon dioxide emissions (CO2) could be nearly double its current 
levels.75 A study by ExxonMobil projects that, by 2030, China’s CO2 emissions 
could equal the level in the United States and EU combined.76 
• The World Health Organization estimated that air pollution in China caused the 
death of 470,649 people in 2008.77 
                                                 
70 Hazardous is the worst category for air quality used by the U.S. embassy, based on a numerical value of its index 
ranging from 301 to 500. A measurement of below 50 is considered good. On several occasions, the air quality index in 
Beijing has surpassed 500, and on January 12, 2013, it reportedly hit 755. 
71 National Public Radio, “Beijing’s ‘Airpocalypse’ Spurs Pollution Controls, Public Pressure,” January 14, 2013. 
72 Xinhua, December 9, 2013. 
73 New York Times, “Concerns Grow About ‘Severely Polluted’ Water in China’s Cities,” February 20, 2013. 
74 The Asian Development Bank, Toward an Environmentally Sustainable Future, Country Environmental Analysis of 
the People’s Republic of China, 2012, p. xviii. 
75 EIA, International Energy Outlook, September 19, 2011, available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo. 
76 ExxonMobil, The Outlook for Energy, A View to 2030, December 29, 2009, p. 4. 
77 World Health Organization chart at http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/phe/oap_mbd/atlas.html. 
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The Chinese government has sharply criticized foreign governments for reporting air quality in 
China, calling their readings inaccurate and complaining that releasing such data violates 
international conventions and Chinese laws.78 At the same time, China’s media has boosted its 
reporting of China’s environmental problems in response to public anger, prompting central 
government officials to promise new steps to reduce emissions. However, the central government 
has often found it difficult to induce SOEs and local governments to comply with environmental 
laws, especially when such officials feel doing so will come at the expense of economic growth.  
Corruption and the Relative Lack of the Rule of Law 
The relative lack of the rule of law in China has led to widespread government corruption, 
financial speculation, and misallocation of investment funds. In many cases, government 
“connections,” not market forces, are the main determinant of successful firms in China. Many 
U.S. firms find it difficult to do business in China because rules and regulations are generally not 
consistent or transparent, contracts are not easily enforced, and intellectual property rights are not 
protected (due to the lack of an independent judicial system). The relative lack of the rule of law 
and widespread government corruption in China limit competition and undermine the efficient 
allocation of goods and services in the economy. A New York Times article reported that (former) 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s family controlled assets worth at least $2.7 billion.79 One study 
estimates that between 2001 and 2010, China was the world’s largest source of illicit capital 
outflows at $3.8 trillion.80 A 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 
reported that 50% of respondents said that corrupt officials are a very big problem (up from 39% 
in 2008).81 Chinese officials often identify government corruption as the greatest threat to the 
Chinese Communist Party and the state. The Chinese government’s anti-corruption watchdog 
reported that 106,000 officials were found guilty of corruption in 2009.82 However, many analysts 
contend that government anti-corruption campaigns are mainly used to settle political scores with 
out-of-favor officials and argue that meaningful progress against government corruption cannot 
occur without greater government transparency, a system of checks and balances, a free press, 
and an independent judiciary.83  
 China maintains a weak and relatively decentralized government structure to regulate economic 
activity in China. Laws and regulations often go unenforced or are ignored by local government 
officials. As a result, many firms cut corners in order to maximize profits. This has led to a 
proliferation of unsafe food and consumer products being sold in China or exported abroad. Lack 
of government enforcement of food safety laws led to a massive recall of melamine-tainted infant 
milk formula that reportedly killed at least four children and sickened 53,000 others in 2008.  
                                                 
78 See Xinhua, “Foreign Embassies’ Air Data Issuing Inaccurate, Unlawful: Official,” June 5, 2012, at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/05/c_131633044.htm 
79 New York Times, “Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader,” October 25, 2012. 
80 Global Financial Integrity, Chinese Economy Lost $3.79 Trillion in Illicit Financial Outflows Since 2000, Reveals 
New GFI Report, October 25, 2012. It is not known how much of the illicit financial outflows in China are directly 
linked to government corruption. 
81 Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, Growing Concerns in China about Inequality, Corruption, October 16, 2012. 
82 BBC News, “Corruption Up Among China Government Officials,” January 8, 2010. 
83 New York Times, “Chinese Officials Find Misbehavior Now Carries Cost,” December 25, 2012. 
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Plans Announced by the Chinese Government 
to Reform and Restructure the Economy 
Various government officials have publicly stated the need for China to change course from its 
traditional economic growth model of growth at all cost to one that balances economic growth 
with a number of social goals in order to develop a “socialist harmonious society,” and to further 
modernize the economy. In March 2007, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that there are 
“structural problems in China’s economy which cause unsteady, unbalanced, uncoordinated and 
unsustainable development.” He defined “unsteady development” as overheated investment, 
excessive credit and liquidity, and merchandise trade and current account surpluses. “Unbalanced 
development” was described as economic disparities between rural and urban areas, regions of 
the country, and between economic and social development. “Uncoordinated development” was 
described as the lack of balance between various sectors of the economy (especially in regards to 
the services sector) and between investment and consumption (i.e., economic growth is mainly 
driven by investment and exports rather than consumer demand). Lastly, “unsustainable 
development” referred to problems caused by China’s inefficient use of energy and resources and 
failure to protect the environment.  
The Central Government Five-Year Plans 
China’s last two five-year plans (FYP), the 11th FYP (2006-2010) and the 12th FYP (2011-2015), 
have placed strong emphasis on promoting consumer demand, addressing income disparities 
(such as by boosting spending on social safety net programs), boosting energy efficiency, 
reducing pollution, improving the rule of law, and deepening economic reforms. Those plans have 
also identified a number of industries and technologies that the government has targeted for 
development (see text box).  
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China’s 12th Five-Year Plan84
China’s Five-Year Plans (FYPs) have been issued by the government since 1953. The FYP is the major vehicle for the 
government to establish broad economic and social goals for the time period under consideration, to coordinate 
investments between the central and local governments, and to oversee implementation of policy. Not only does the 
plan influence investments by government entities, it also provides direction for bank lending and government 
approvals and regulation of private and semi-private industries. In March 2011, China’s National People’s Congress 
approved the 12th Five-Year Plan (covering the years 2011 to 2015). 
The 12th FYP (2011-2015) contains three broad themes or areas of focus: (1) economic restructuring, (2) promoting 
greater social equality, and (3) protecting the environment. Chinese industrial policy comes into play primarily in 
economic restructuring but also is apparent in the other areas of focus. Particularly noteworthy is the targeting of 
seven strategic emerging industries that are intended to become the backbone of China’s economy in the future and 
to be able to compete well on a global scale. These seven industries are (1) biotechnology; (2) new energy; (3) high-
end equipment manufacturing; (4) energy conservation and environmental protection; (5) clean-energy vehicles; (6) 
new materials; and (7) next-generation information technology. The government reportedly intends to spend up to 
$2.1 trillion on these industries during the 12th FYP. Some of the highlights of the FYP include the following: 
• Achieving an average real GDP growth rate of 7% and ensuring that incomes rise at least as fast as GDP; 
• Consolidating inefficient sectors and promoting the services industry (with the goal of expanding service sector 
output to account for 47% of GDP—up four percentage points from the current level); 
• Promoting energy saving and new energy industries; promoting the development of nuclear, water, wind, and 
solar power; and expanding non-fossil fuel to account for 11.4% of primary energy consumption; 
• Welcoming foreign investment in modern agriculture, high-technology, and environmental protection industries;  
• Turning coastal regions from “world’s factory” to hubs of research and development, high-end manufacturing, 
and services; 
• Lengthening high-speed railway and highway networks;  
• Increasing expenditure on R&D to account for 2.2% of GDP;  
• Expanding non-fossil fuel to account for 11.4% of primary energy consumption;  
• Cutting water consumption per unit of value-added industrial output by 30%, energy consumption per unit of 
GDP by 16%, and carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP by 17%;  
• Increasing the minimum wage by no less than 13% on average each year; and  
• Building 36 million affordable apartments for low-income people. 
Sources: Xinhua News Agency, Highlights of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, March 5, 2011; and APCO Worldwide, 
China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: How it Actually Works and What’s in Store For the Next Five Years, December 10, 2010. 
The Drive for “Indigenous Innovation” 
Many of the industrial policies that China has implemented or formulated since 2006 appear to 
stem largely from a comprehensive document issued by China’s State Council (the highest 
executive organ of state power) in 1996 titled The National Medium-and Long-Term Program for 
Science and Technology Development (2006-2020), often referred to as the MLP. The MLP 
appears to represent an ambitious plan to modernize the structure of China’s economy by 
transforming it from a global center of low-tech manufacturing to a major center of innovation 
(by the year 2020) and a global innovation leader by 2050. As some observers describe it, China 
wants to go from a model of “made in China” to “innovated in China.” It also seeks to sharply 
reduce the country’s dependence on foreign technology. The MLP includes the stated goals of 
                                                 
84 “Highlights of China's Draft 12th Five-Year Plan,” Xinhua, March 5, 2011. 
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“indigenous innovation, leapfrogging in priority fields, enabling development, and leading the 
future.”85 Some of the broad goals of the MLP state that by 2020: 
• The progress of science and technology will contribute 60% or above to China’s 
development.  
• The country’s reliance on foreign technology will decline to 30% or below (from 
an estimated current level of 50%). 
• Gross expenditures for research and development (R&D) would rise to 2.5% of 
gross domestic product (from 1.3% in 2005). Priority areas for increased R&D 
include space programs, aerospace development and manufacturing, renewable 
energy, computer science, and life sciences.86 
The document states that “China must place the strengthening of indigenous innovative capability 
at the core of economic restructuring, growth model change, and national competitiveness 
enhancement. Building an innovation-oriented country is therefore a major strategic choice for 
China’s future development.” This goal, according to the document, is to be achieved by 
formulating and implementing regulations in the country’s government procurement law to 
“encourage and protect indigenous innovation,” establishing a coordination mechanism for 
government procurement of indigenous innovative products, requiring a first-buy policy for major 
domestically made high-tech equipment and products that possess proprietary intellectual 
property rights, providing policy support to enterprises in procuring domestic high-tech 
equipment, and developing “relevant technology standards” through government procurement.  
Economic Policies Outlined in the November 2013 Third Plenum 
From November 9-12, 2013, the Communist Party of China held the Third Plenum of its 18th 
Party Congress, a meeting that many analysts anticipated would result in the initiation of 
extensive new economic reforms under China’s new leadership. Following the meeting, the 
Communist Party issued a communique with a number of broad (and often vague) policy 
statements on reforms to be implemented by 2020, and then a few days later it issued a 60-point 
document that provided more detail of the Plenum’s results. Many of the proposed reforms 
addressed issues to boost competition and economic efficiency. The Plenum also established a 
new “Central Leading Group” to design and coordinate the proposed reforms. 
One of the major results of the Plenum highlighted by the Chinese media was that the market 
would now play a “decisive” role in allocating resources in the economy. China’s media stated the 
economic reforms announced in the communique were comparable to those announced in 1978, 
when major reforms were first undertaken, and in 1992, when the Communist party agreed that 
the market should be the “basic” means of allocating resources under the concept of a socialist 
market economy. The 2013 Plenum communique thus elevated markets from having a “basic” 
                                                 
85 The MLP identifies main areas and priority topics, including energy, water and mineral resources, the environment, 
agriculture, manufacturing, communications and transport, information industry and modern service industries, 
population and health, urbanization and urban development, public security, and national defense. The report also 
identifies 16 major special projects and 8 “pioneer technologies.” 
86 R&D Magazine, December 22, 2009. 
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role in resource allocation to having a “decisive” role.87 It further stated that “both public and 
non-public ownership are key components of China’s socialist market economy.” 
While appearing to elevate the role of the private sector in the economy, the Plenum communique 
also emphasized the importance of the public sector in the economy, stating that China “must 
unwaveringly consolidate and develop the publicly owned economy, persist in the dominant role 
of the public ownership system, give rein to the leading role of the State-owned economy, and 
incessantly strengthen the vitality, control, strength and influence of the State-owned economy.” 
Some observers contend that this could indicate that the Chinese government will continue to 
actively support and protect state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Others argue that the Plenum 
documents indicate that SOEs will be subject to structural and market-based reforms. 
For example, the 60-point document indicates that China plans to push forward with market-
based price reforms, including for water, oil, natural gas, electricity, transport, and 
telecommunications (sectors that generally been dominated by SOEs and used to subsidize other 
SOEs); allow nonpublic entities to invest in SOEs; and increase the level of dividends SOEs are 
required to transfer back to the government for use in social safety net programs. The document 
emphasizes the goals of perfecting a mechanism where prices are determined by the market; 
making market rules that are fair, open, and transparent; implementing a unified market entrance 
system where market players of all kind are allowed to compete (except in sectors on a “negative 
list”); reducing regional protectionism; and improving market exit mechanisms to promote the 
“survival of the fittest.”  
Other proposed areas of reforms include improving protection of intellectual property rights; 
implementing new financial reforms (such as allowing more private banks, improving market 
mechanisms for the exchange rate of the renminbi, and accelerating interest rate liberalization and 
capital account convertibility); liberalizing rules on foreign investment and establishing new free 
trade zones; and improving macroeconomic control over the economy while reducing 
government involvement in market operations.  
The extent of China’s economic reforms resulting from the meeting (and how they will be 
implemented) will not be fully understood until more information is made available by the 
Chinese government. As noted by U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew, who visited Beijing shortly 
after the Plenum: “I think there is going to continue to be progress, but the question is how much 
and how quickly.” 
                                                 
87 For example, an editorial by Xinhua on November 13, 2013, stated that this was “not only a change in wording, but 
more importantly, a breakthrough in China's market reform and highlighting the importance of market power. The 
expression also means that the state should exert the government's role under the domination of the market, rather than 
exerting the market's role under the domination of the government.”  
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Challenges to U.S. Policy of China’s Economic Rise 
China’s rapid economic growth and emergence as a major economic power have given China’s 
leadership increased confidence in its economic model. Many believe the key challenges for the 
United States are to convince China that (1) it has a stake in maintaining the international trading 
system, which is largely responsible for its economic rise, and to take a more active leadership 
role in maintaining that system; and (2) that further economic and trade reforms are the surest 
way for China to grow and modernize its economy. For example, by boosting domestic spending 
and allowing its currency to appreciate, China would import more, which would help speed 
economic recovery in other countries, promote more stable and balanced economic growth in 
China, and lessen trade protectionist pressures around the world. Lowering trade barriers on 
imports would boost competition in China, lower costs for consumers, and increase economic 
efficiency. However, many U.S. stakeholders are concerned that China’s efforts to boost the 
development of indigenous innovation and technology could result in greater intervention by the 
state (such as subsidies, trade and investment barriers, and discriminatory policies), which could 
negatively affect U.S. IP-intensive firms. Failure by China to take meaningful steps to rebalance 
its economy could increase tensions with its trading partners, especially if China’s share of global 
exports continues to increase rapidly, and if that increase is viewed as being the result of non-
market policies that give Chinese exports an unfair competitive advantage.88 Some economists 
contend that some economic rebalancing by China appears to have taken place in recent years, 
noting that China’s current account surplus as a percent of GDP declined from a historical high of 
10.1% in 2007 to 2.1% in 2013 (see Figure 19). In addition, private consumption as a percent of 
GDP has risen annually from 2011 to 2013. However, many economists contend that much of the 
reduction in China’s current account surplus may largely be the result of sluggish global demand 
for Chinese products, rather than a significant change in Chinese economic policies. In July 2012, 
the IMF stated that, although the fall of China’s current account surplus was a welcome sign, the 
external rebalancing was achieved at the cost of rising internal imbalances—namely the high rate 
of investment spending, which, the IMF assessed, would be difficult to sustain.89 In addition, 
gross fixed investment as a percent of GDP grew each year from 2011 to 2013, and continues to 
be the dominant source of China’s GDP growth.  
                                                 
88 Sharp increases in Chinese exports of higher-end manufacturing could also raise trade tensions between China and its 
major trading partners. This has already occurred in some areas, such as wind turbines and solar panels.  
89 IMF, People’s Republic of China: 2010 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report For the 2012 Article IV Consultation, 
July 6, 2011, p. 1. 
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Figure 19. Current Account Balances as a Percent of GDP for China 
and the United States: 2000-2013 
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Source: International Monetary Fund. 
Opinions differ as to the most effective way of dealing with China on major economic issues. 
Some support a policy of engagement with China using various forums, such as the U.S.-China 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), which holds discussions on major long-term 
economic issues at the highest government level. Others support a somewhat mixed policy of 
using engagement when possible, coupled with a more aggressive use of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) dispute settlement procedures to address China’s unfair trade policies. Still 
others, who see China as a growing threat to the U.S. economy and the global trading system, 
advocate a policy of trying to contain China’s economic power and using punitive measures when 
needed to force China to “play by the rules.” Media reports of extensive cyber espionage by 
Chinese entities (including the Chinese military) against U.S. firms have also raised concern in 
the United States over how to respond to what many see as a serious threat to U.S. economic 
interests.90 
China’s growing economic power has made it a critical and influential player on the global stage 
on a number of issues important to U.S. interests, such as global economic cooperation, climate 
change, nuclear proliferation, and North Korean aggression.91 China is in a position to help 
advance U.S. interests or to frustrate them. China’s rising economy has also enabled it to boost its 
military capabilities. 
U.S. policy makers face a number of complex challenges on how to deal with these issues. Can 
the United States compel better behavior from China via quiet diplomacy or public confrontation? 
                                                 
90 For example, see Mandiant, APT1, Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, February 19, 2013. The report 
documents cyber espionage by a Chinese entity (believed to be linked to the Chinese People’s Liberation) against more 
than 141 companies in 20 industries. 
91 For additional information on these issues, see CRS Report R41108, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy 
Issues, by Susan V. Lawrence. 
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Has U.S. leverage over Beijing lessened in the wake of China’s economic rise, and has China’s 
leverage over Washington increased? Are China’s new leaders serious about undertaking 
comprehensive reforms as outlined in the Third Plenum?92 Does Chinese President Xi Jinping 
have the power to implement new economic reforms if they are opposed by other factions of the 
government that have a stake in maintaining the status quo? To what extent will the Chinese 
government be willing to reduce or eliminate preferential policies (such as subsidies and 
preferential bank loans) given to SOEs? Will the reforms result in a significant reduction in trade 
and investment barriers against U.S. firms? 
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92 In March 2013, Xi Jinping formally replaced Hu Jintao as China’s President (Xi is also general secretary of the 
Communist Party of China Central Committee). Many analysts argue that during the eight years of Hu’s presidency, 
economic reforms in China were essentially stalled (and in some instances, reversed) compared to policies under the 
previous Chinese leader, President Jiang Zemin. On several occasions, China’s media has reported President Xi call for 
deepening economic reforms, but few specific reforms been announced by the government to date.  
